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DEMOCRATIZING CRIMINAL LAW: 
FEASIBILITY, UTILITY, AND THE CHALLENGE 
OF SOCIAL CHANGE 
Paul H. Robinson 
ABSTRACT—There are good reasons to be initially hesitant about shaping 
criminal law rules to track the justice judgments of ordinary people. People 
seem to disagree about many criminal law issues. Their judgments, at least 
as reflected in many aspects of current law such as three strikes and high 
penalties for drug offenses, seem harsh to many. Effective crime control 
would seem to require the expertise of trained experts and scholars who 
understand the complexities of general deterrence and the identification and 
incapacitation of the dangerous. 
But this brief Essay, which reviews some previous studies and 
analyses, argues that distributing criminal liability and punishment 
according to the shared judgments of the community—so-called “empirical 
desert”—does not have the failings that many assume, such as those 
described above, and indeed ought to be preferred by both moral 
philosophers and crime-control utilitarians. It represents the best practical 
approximation of deontological desert. And it offers the greatest potential 
for effective crime control because, by tracking community views, the 
criminal law can build its moral credibility with the community and thereby 
harness the potentially enormous powers of social influence and 
internalized norms. 
AUTHOR—Colin S. Diver Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania 
Law School. Many thanks to Joshua Kleinfeld, Rick Bierschbach, and the 
editors of the Northwestern University Law Review.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The notion of “democratizing criminal law” has an initial appeal 
because, after all, we believe in the importance of democracy and because 
criminal law is so important—it protects us from the most egregious 
wrongs and is the vehicle by which we allow the most serious 
governmental intrusions in the lives of individuals. Given criminal law’s 
special status, isn’t it appropriate that this most important and most 
intrusive governmental power be subject to the constraints of democratic 
determination?  
But perhaps the initial appeal of this grand principle must give way to 
practical realities. As much as we are devoted to democratic ideals, perhaps 
the path to a better society is one that must recognize inherent weaknesses 
in the system of democratic action, which necessarily relies upon the 
judgments of common people. Perhaps, when dealing with things as 
important as doing justice and preventing crime, we must look instead to 
experts, such as criminologists and moral philosophers. Perhaps the path to 
a better society is one that, in this instance, should skirt democratic 
preferences as needed? 
More specifically, consider some of the realities that might derail a 
movement toward democratizing criminal law. First, perhaps there is no 
such thing as a shared community view of justice on which to base a 
system of criminal law, but simply an endless list of individual 
disagreements. There can be no such thing as a criminal code that reflects 
community views if there is no such thing as a shared community view. 
Second, even if there were a shared community sense of justice, perhaps 
that view is something born of anger and suspicion, brutish and draconian, 
and something that even the people themselves feel should not be publicly 
enshrined in principles of liability and punishment. Third, even if 
community views of justice are in fact enlightened, perhaps they do not 
achieve a more pervasive goal of reducing crime. That is, perhaps the path 
to effective crime control is not through justice—either the community’s 
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view of it or the moral philosopher’s view—but through more 
instrumentalist crime-control mechanisms, such as general deterrence or 
incapacitation of the dangerous. And finally, even if relying upon the 
community’s views of justice was an effective crime-control mechanism, 
wouldn’t such a system condemn us to live under the status quo of current 
community views? History teaches us that a society can improve itself and 
the lives of its members only by moving ever forward in refining its 
judgments of justice. 
Thus, this brief Essay will take up these four questions: (1) Is there 
any such thing as the community’s views of justice? (2) Are the 
community’s views of justice brutish and draconian? (3) Why should a 
criminal law concerned with crime-control care what the community thinks 
is just? (4) Should criminal law ever deviate from the community’s shared 
judgments of justice? 
I. IS THERE ANY SUCH THING AS THE COMMUNITY’S VIEWS OF JUSTICE?
Given the subjective and complex nature of judgments about justice,
one would expect disagreement among people. But the research suggests 
otherwise. It shows a high degree of agreement about judgments of justice 
across all demographics, at least for what one might call the core of 
wrongdoing—physical aggression, taking property without consent, and 
deceit in exchanges. As potential crimes move out from this core, the 
judgments become culturally dependent, and thus more diverse.1 
The high level of agreement seen is not agreement on the exact 
punishment that should be imposed in any particular case, but rather is 
agreement on the relative blameworthiness of different offenders, a rank-
ordering of cases according to the punishment they deserve. People and 
societies will disagree about the severity of punishment to impose. 
Different people may want to set a different high-end point on the 
punishment continuum. Some may set the high-end point as the death 
penalty; others may set it at life imprisonment, while still others may set it 
at ten years’ imprisonment. The high-end point is a culturally dependent 
determination and is thus malleable. But once the high-end point is set, as it 
must be in every society, people commonly will agree where on the 
punishment continuum a given case falls for the amount of punishment 
deserved. 
1 For a more detailed discussion of these issues and the studies cited infra notes 2–6, see PAUL H.
ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE AND THE UTILITY OF DESERT ch. 2 (2013) [hereinafter ROBINSON, 
IJUD]. 
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In one study, for example, subjects were asked to rank order twenty-
four scenarios describing a criminal event according to their proper level of 
punishment. Each story described a particular course of potentially 
wrongful conduct for a wide range of offenses, from minor assault or theft 
to serious wrongdoing such as robbery or murder. The results showed that 
essentially all subjects ranked the twenty-four scenarios the same, with 
agreement across all demographics. That is, the results were not affected by 
the subject’s gender, age, level of education, political views, race, marital 
status, religion, income, or any other typically influential demographic. 
Strikingly, the level of agreement measured by Kendall’s W (a 
coefficient of concordance in which 1.0 means perfect agreement) was 0.95 
among subjects tested in person and 0.88 among subjects tested on the 
internet. As a point of comparison, in a study of American men ranking the 
beauty of women with different waist-to-hip ratios, the researchers found a 
Kendall’s W of 0.54.2 A study of travel magazine readers ranking 
destinations by danger of terrorism found a Kendall’s W of 0.52.3 
Economists ranking the top twenty economic journals by quality had a 
Kendall’s W of 0.095.4 
Indeed, to get a Kendall’s W as high as this judgments-of-justice 
study, one must look to what are close to pure perceptual tasks. For 
example, in one study, subjects were asked to judge the overall relative 
brightness of different clusters of differently shaded dots. Subjects 
generally agreed in their rankings, with a Kendall’s W of 0.95.5 In another 
study, researchers tested the seven faces you see below, showing different 
levels of discomfort. These are the faces used by doctors to get pain level 
information from patients who are too young to speak, or who do not speak 
the doctor’s language. Subjects typically agreed when asked to rank the 
images according to the amount of pain they showed, with a Kendall’s W 
of 0.97.6 
2 Frank Marlowe & Adam Wetsman, Preferred Waist-to-Hip Ratio and Ecology, 30 PERSONALITY
& INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 481, 483 (2001). 
3 Baruch Fischhoff, Wändi Bruine De Bruin, Wendy Perrin & Julie Downs, Travel Risks in a Time 
of Terror: Judgments and Choices, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 1301, 1303 (2004).  
4 Kostas Axarloglou & Vasilis Theoharakis, Diversity in Economics: An Analysis of Journal 
Quality Perceptions, 1 J. EUROPEAN ECON. ASS’N 1402, 1421–22 (2003). 
5 Charles M M de Weert & Noud A W H van Kruysbergen, Assimilation: Central and Peripheral 
Effects, 26 PERCEPTION 1217, 1221 (1997). 
6 Keela A. Herr, Paula R. Mobily, Frank J. Kohout & Diane Wagenaar, Evaluation of the Faces 
Pain Scale for Use with the Elderly, 14:1 CLINICAL J. PAIN 29, 29 (1998), 
http://journals.lww.com/pain/fulltext/10.1016/0304-3959(90)90018-9. Figure 1, also known as the 
Faces Pain Scale, originated in a 1990 study. Davia Bieri, Robert A. Reeve, G. David Champion, 
Louise Addicoat & John B. Ziegler, The Faces Pain Scale for the Assessment of the Severity of Pain 
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FIGURE 1 
Important here is the fact that there is not an infinite number of 
meaningfully different points on a punishment continuum. The 
meaningfully different punishment units become larger as the punishment 
amount increases. The difference between sentences of three days and 
seven days is meaningful to people, but the difference between a sentence 
of ten years and three days versus ten years and seven days is not seen as 
meaningful different. The higher on the punishment continuum, the larger 
the meaningful punishment units. Thus, the number of meaningfully 
different punishment units on the punishment continuum is limited.  
Yet, the number of cases that people will see as meaningfully different 
in the punishment deserved is very high. That is, each case requires a 
specific amount of punishment, not just a general range of punishment. 
There is not some magical connection between an offense and an amount 
of punishment. Rather, the specific amount of punishment required is an 
amount of punishment that will put that offense in its proper ordinal rank. 
This helps explain why it has taken us so long to discover the high 
level of agreement on the relative seriousness of different core wrongs. 
People’s disagreements about general severity of punishment—such as 
their disagreement about the proper high-end point of the punishment 
continuum—obscured their common agreement on relative 
blameworthiness.7 
 People commonly have a quick answer to such questions as “Should 
someone be punished for what they have done?” and “If so, what is the 
relative blameworthiness of this offender and offense as compared to other 
offenses?” The answers could be the result of reasoning—thinking 
carefully through the issue and applying some set of principles. However, 
for many, these answers are intuitional rather than reasoned. That is, these 
answers come to them without logically thinking through steps in applying 
principles. Instead, they arrive at an answer almost as if they were 
observing it as a fact. 
As the Kahneman graphic depicts below, intuitions have much in 
common with pure perception. Intuitions produce answers that are fast, 
Experienced by Children: Development, Initial Validation, and Preliminary Investigation for Ratio 
Scale Properties, 41:2 PAIN 139, 144 (1990), http://journals.lww.com/clinicalpain/toc/1998/03000. 
7 For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see ROBINSON, IJUD, supra note 1, at ch. 2. 
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automatic, and effortless. The speed of intuitions is quite different from the 
speed of reasoning, which tends to be slow, controlled, and effortful. What 
is so striking, and so interesting, about intuitions is that unlike perceptions, 
which typically deal with very simple, objective things, intuitions can 
concern complex and conceptual things, which typically are the subject of 
reasoning.8 
FIGURE 2 
Intuitions of justice are a good example. Judgments about justice seem 
complex and subtle, yet when they are intuitional, people arrive at them 
quickly and effortlessly. Further, people have no access to why they came 
to an intuitive conclusion. Unlike a reasoned conclusion, where they 
understand and remember the series of steps that brought them to that 
conclusion, intuitions seem obvious to them—so obvious as to not require 
an explanation. Educated people in particular, who might pride themselves 
on being rational, will commonly make up reasons after the fact to explain 
and give the appearance of rationality to their intuitive judgments. But 
these reasons are not how they reached their respective intuitive 
conclusions; they are only an attempt to justify them.9 
What is perhaps most striking about people’s justice judgments is that 
they are quite nuanced and sophisticated. Small changes in facts can 
produce large and predictable changes in liability judgments. Yet 
8 Figure 2 was originally produced in Daniel Kahneman, A Perspective on Judgment and Choice 
Mapping Bounded Rationality, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 697, 698 (2003). Reprinted with permission 
from the American Psychological Association (APA). For a more detailed discussion of these issues, 
see ROBINSON, IJUD, supra note 1, at 6–7.  
9 For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see ROBINSON, IJUD, supra note 1, at ch. 1. 
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sophistication does not depend upon education, intelligence, or upon other 
demographic factors. Research has repeatedly shown this to be true in a 
wide range of criminal law contexts. Examples of this are found in the 
following areas: the objective requirements of complicity; attempt; 
causation; offense culpability doctrines such as mistake, accident, 
voluntary intoxication, and the partial individualization of the reasonable 
person standard for negligence; justification doctrines such as defensive 
force and law enforcement use of force; culpability requirements; excuse 
doctrines such as insanity, immaturity, involuntary intoxication, duress, and 
entrapment; grading doctrines such as those relating to sexual offenses and 
homicide offenses; testing empirical claims of theoretical literature; and 
using individualized judgments to test competing scholarly theories, such 
as the nature of justification defenses, blackmail, and the nature of the shift 
from common law to modern penal codes.10 
This picture of laypersons’ judgments of justice—high levels of 
agreement on the relative blameworthiness of many aspects of the core 
wrongdoing, the apparently intuitional nature of many aspects of these 
judgments, and the high level of nuance and sophistication—may seem a 
bit puzzling. What can possibly explain why we are built this way? 
One theory, supported by a good deal of evidence, suggests that this 
aspect of human nature results from pressures of evolutionary 
development. Early human groups on the Serengeti Plain were surrounded 
by bigger, faster, and stronger predators. What saved them—what made 
humans the most successful species in the history of the planet—was the 
ability they developed for cooperative action. To maintain cooperative 
action, a group must have certain foundational rules of conduct among 
members. The “core of wrongdoing” so universally agreed upon across 
demographics seems a good candidate for these foundational rules: no 
physical aggression against other group members, no taking of another’s 
property without consent, and no deceit in exchanges. To allow such 
victimization would be to risk undermining the cooperation of the group 
member being victimized. 
But the rules mean nothing without enforcement, so a system of 
punishment for violating the foundational rules must exist to maintain a 
desired level of cooperation. Complicating things is the fact that the only 
available methods of punishment seem themselves to be violations of the 
basic prohibitions: beating a violator, or taking his possessions, or 
depriving him of his share of the group’s food. Thus, the group members 
had to appreciate the existence and special status of punishment for 
10 For more details, see ROBINSON, IJUD, supra note 1, and infra Parts III–IV. 
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violation, and to develop some kind of shared understanding of what 
constituted a violation and what constituted appropriate punishment for it. 
The propriety of punishing wrongdoing and the notion of proportionality 
between the seriousness of the violation and the seriousness of the 
punishment are the foundational principles upon which laypersons of today 
tend to agree. It would seem to fit nicely with the demands of the 
punishment system among the early human groups on the Serengeti Plain. 
The groups that can develop and maintain such shared understandings can 
most effectively maintain their cooperative nature and will flourish. The 
groups that cannot do so will lose their cooperative nature and die out.11 
Humans are not the animals who created the notion of cooperative 
action, the institution of punishment, and the principle of proportionality. 
Rather, the 125,000 generations of humans were simply building on the 
foundation of those principles established by their evolutionary ancestors. 
More rudimentary forms of the same notions can be seen in the conduct of 
many animal species, especially those that show cooperative social 
structures.12 Also support for the notion of a partially innate human 
predisposition toward these principles is found in the child development 
literature. Most striking here is that social scientists can identify a 
predictable pattern of moral development that is quite detailed—predicting 
specific stages of development at specific ages—that is seen in every 
known human society on the planet and is immune to demographic 
differences.13 
Given the enormous influence of one’s life experience, be it one’s 
culture, gender, education, socioeconomic status, race, religion, or any 
number of other influential demographic variables, how could it be that 
despite these dramatic differences there can exist such human universals? 
That such universals do exist illustrates the power of their influence and 
supports the notion that there is a partially innate human predisposition at 
work. That predisposition no doubt can play out in different ways—
conditions of starvation, as opposed to conditions allowing one to earn a 
Ph.D. in economics, may influence how the predisposition develops—but 
there is every reason to believe that there exists a shared core that is part of 
the human character. 
Interestingly, we see common patterns of conduct and attitudes in 
relation to judgments of justice even in the most extreme situations. 
11 For a more detailed discussion, see ROBINSON, IJUD, supra note 1, at 36–41. 
12 For a more detailed discussion, see ROBINSON, IJUD, supra note 1, at ch. 3. For a more popular 
presentation of these issues, see PAUL H. ROBINSON & SARAH M. ROBINSON, PIRATES, PRISONERS, AND 
LEPERS: LESSONS FROM LIFE OUTSIDE THE LAW chs. 2–4 (2015). 
13 For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see ROBINSON, IJUD, supra note 1, at 48–54. 
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Examining a host of natural experiments over the past century or two in 
which human groups were thrust into a situation where government and 
law could no longer have an effect on them, we still see evidence of the 
human predisposition toward shared views of wrongdoing and punishment 
across a staggeringly varied set of absent-law situations. These natural 
experiments include plane crashes, shipwrecks, forced leper colonies, gold-
mining camps, pirate colonies, inmates in prison camps, prisoners after an 
uprising, residents of occupied territory in war, and a host of other absent-
law situations.14 
All of this is not to suggest that there is agreement on all criminal 
liability and punishment rules. There is not. As noted above, while people 
may agree on the relative seriousness of many aspects of core 
wrongdoings, they disagree on other issues. Also, the further out from the 
core, the greater disagreement can be. Further out from the core, the 
ultimate judgment increasingly depends upon a larger measure of reasoned 
judgment extrapolating from an initial intuition, and is more influenced by 
cultural or other demographic variables. But the larger point is that, 
contrary to the once common wisdom, justice judgments are not all matters 
on which everyone disagrees about everything. Some universal principles 
do exist, which means that one can reasonably speak of a core of a 
“community view.” 
In my discussion of the third question of this Essay, I will come back 
to the issue of the existence of disagreements on some issues. The 
significance of points of disagreement depends in part upon whether and 
why one cares about community views in the first place. 
Assuming that there is a community view of justice, if we are to move 
beyond academic discussion to the practical realities of lawmaking, we 
must face the possibility that different communities have somewhat 
different views on some criminal law matters. Thus, we must be able to 
answer the question, “Which community?” But the answer to that is simple, 
even obvious: the relevant community is that which will be bound by the 
rule being enacted. If the issue is how to construct a state criminal code, 
then the relevant community is the residents of that state. If the issue is the 
provision of a municipal code, the relevant population is the residents of 
that city. If the issue arises in the federal criminal code, the relevant 
population is all U.S. residents. 
To summarize, research suggests there is a high degree of agreement 
among people at least in regard to crimes that are the core of wrongdoing. 
In addition, while people may disagree as to the exact punishment that 
14 See generally ROBINSON & ROBINSON, PIRATES, supra note 12. 
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should be imposed, they generally agree as to the relative severity of 
punishment that should be given based on the relative severity of the 
offense. Therefore, it seems at least a colorable community view of justice 
exists. This brings us to our second question, which is whether this 
community view of justice may be draconian and brutish. 
II. ARE THE COMMUNITY’S VIEWS OF JUSTICE
BRUTISH AND DRACONIAN? 
One might conclude that there is such a thing as the community view 
of justice yet be appalled at the notion that a society should give deference 
to this view given the practical evidence on display about where such 
deference would take us. Consider some of the politically popular criminal 
law doctrines common in the United States: (1) the “three strikes” statutes, 
which can provide long prison terms for an offender who has previous 
criminal convictions, (2) high penalties for drug-related offenses, (3) rules 
reducing the age at which an offender can be prosecuted as an adult, (4) 
rules narrowing or eliminating the insanity defense, (5) the use of “strict 
liability” offenses, which do not require that the offender had a culpable 
state of mind toward the conduct and circumstances of the offense, and (6) 
the “felony murder rule,” which provides that anyone causing a death even 
accidentally during the commission of a felony is liable for murder, the 
most serious form of homicide otherwise reserved for intentional killings. 
It may be no surprise that people commonly assume that such criminal 
law doctrines reflect community views, given that we are living in a 
democracy. But that assumption turns out to be wrong. Consider a recent 
study that tested laypersons’ judgments of justice on the six illustrative 
doctrines listed above. Subjects were given a dozen “milestone scenarios” 
that previous testing had shown represented the full spectrum of relative 
blameworthiness. These scenarios presented cases from something as 
trivial as mistakenly taking another person’s umbrella at a restaurant to 
intentionally killing another person in an ambush. Subjects were also given 
a dozen scenarios, each based on a real-world case, that involve one of the 
six crime-control doctrines above. Those “crime-control scenarios” are 
summarized on the table below.15 
15 This table is reproduced from ROBINSON, IJUD, supra note 1, at 123. For additional information 
on this study, see Paul Robinson, Geoffrey P. Goodwin & Michael D. Reisig, The Disutility of Injustice, 
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940 (2010). 
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TABLE 1 
Scenario Case Name Offense 
Crime-Control 
Doctrine 
Actual Court 
Sentence 
L. Accidental
teacher shooting
Brazill Murder 
Adult Prosecution 
of Juveniles 
28 years w/o 
parole 
K. Drowning
children to save
them from hell
Yates Murder 
Narrowing 
Insanity Defense 
life 
J. Accomplice
killing during
burglary 
Moore 
Felony murder, 
burglary 
Felony Murder 
life at hard labor 
w/o parole 
I. Killing officer
believed to be
alien 
Clark Murder 
Narrowing 
Insanity Defense 
life 
H. Cocaine
overdose
Heacock 
Felony murder, 
unlawful 
distribution of 
controlled 
substance 
Felony Murder 40 years 
G. Cocaine in
trunk
Harmelin 
Complicity in 
unlawful 
distribution of 
controlled 
substance 
Drug Offense 
Penalties 
life w/o parole 
F. Air conditioner
fraud 
Rummel Petty fraud Three Strikes life w/o parole 
E. Sex with female 
reasonably
believed overage 
Haas Statutory rape Strict Liability 40 to 60 years 
D. Underage sex
by mentally
retarded man
Garnett Statutory rape Strict Liability 5 years 
C. Marijuana
unloading
Papa 
Unlawful 
possession of 
controlled 
substance 
Drug Offense 
Penalties 
8 years 
B. Shooting of TV Almond 
Unlawfully 
discharging 
firearm 
Three Strikes 
15 years w/o 
parole 
A. Incorrect
lobster container 
Blandford 
Violation of 
importation 
regulations 
Criminalizing 
Regulatory 
Violations 
15 years to life 
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Subjects were asked to rank order all two dozen cases and to give an 
appropriate sentence to each. The results are summarized in Table 2 
below.16 The numbered cases on the left-hand margin are the milestone 
scenarios. The indented and lettered italicized cases are the crime-control 
scenarios. 
TABLE 2 
Scenario 
Subjects’ Mean 
Sentence 
Actual Court 
Sentence 
12. Ambush shooting
between life and 
death 
11. Stabbing essentially life 
10. Accidental mauling by pit bulls 20.6 years 
L. Accidental teacher shooting (juvenile) 19.2 years 
28 years w/o 
parole 
K. Drowning children to save them from hell
(insanity)
26.3 years life 
J. Accomplice killing during burglary (felony
murder)
17.7 years 
life at hard labor 
w/o parole 
9. Clubbing during robbery 12.0 years 
8. Attempted robbery at gas station 9.1 years 
I. Killing officer believed to be alien (insanity) 16.5 years life 
H. Cocaine overdose (felony murder) 10.7 years 40 years 
7. Stitches after soccer game 5.0 years 
6. Slap and bruising at record store 3.9 years 
G. Cocaine in trunk (drugs) 4.2 years life w/o parole 
F. Air conditioner fraud (three strikes) 3.1 years life w/o parole 
5. Microwave from house 2.3 years 
E. Sex with female reasonably believed overage
(strict liability)
2.9 years 40 to 60 years 
4. Clock radio from car 1.9 years 
D. Underage sex by mentally retarded man (strict
liability)
2.3 years 5 years 
C. Marijuana unloading (drugs) 1.9 years 8 years 
B. Shooting of TV (three strikes) 1.1 years 
15 years w/o 
parole 
3. Whole pies from buffet 8.3 months 
A. Incorrect lobster container (regulatory) 9.7 months 15 years to life 
2. Wolf hallucination 1.1 years 
1. Umbrella mistake 1.8 months 
16 This table is reproduced from ROBINSON, IJUD, supra note 1, at 125. For additional information 
about this study, see Robinson et al., supra note 15. 
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Below is a more graphic presentation of the information in Table 2.17 
The cases on the left of the graphic are the milestone scenarios, which 
provide points of comparison along the full length of the punishment 
continuum. The lines from each case to the punishment scale show how 
severely the lay persons would punish each of these milestone offenses. 
On the right are the cases illustrating the six common crime-control 
doctrines described above. The solid lines on the right show the amount of 
punishment that the study’s subjects would impose in each case. The dotted 
lines show what punishment the law would impose, and did actually 
impose in the case. As you see, the law’s punishment is dramatically higher 
than that of the study’s subjects. The difference is even more striking when 
you take into account that the punishment continuum used here is 
exponential. That is, moving from ❶ to ❷ triples the punishment (from 
two months to six months), just as moving from ❸ to ❹ triples the 
punishment (from one year to three years). Thus, the large difference 
between the solid lines and the dotted lines for each case shows that the 
punishment the law imposes is commonly many times more severe than 
what the study’s subjects would impose. 
FIGURE 3 
17 This figure is reproduced from ROBINSON, IJUD, supra note 1, at 127, and Robinson et al., supra 
note 15, at 1973. 
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How could such a discrepancy occur in a democracy, where the laws 
are enacted by elected representatives of the people? The underlying causes 
of this phenomena are the operation of crime politics in the United States. 
First, politicians have been persuaded—often by academics—that they 
should focus on crime control without regard to its effect on deserved 
punishment. And second, politicians frequently use criminal law legislation 
for their own political purposes, rather than to do justice or prevent crime.18 
Many amendments and new offenses are enacted to show constituents their 
concern for some headline issue. However, we cannot be too critical here. 
Politicians are simply trying to be responsive to their community—
normally something we see as a good thing, and usually a positive feature 
of democracy. 
But in many instances, “the problem” about which some constituents 
or the local newspaper headlines are concerned has little to do with a flaw 
in an existing criminal law. Not every problem can be fixed with a criminal 
code amendment. People will continue to commit outrageous crimes, 
judges will continue to make what are seen as sentencing errors, and so on. 
Yet, legislators often feel a need to do something to show that they are 
sensitive to their constituents’ concerns. And there are few “somethings” 
that they can do. Changing or adding to the criminal law is one of the few 
things available. But when crime legislation is simply a vehicle for 
expressing concern, drafters have few ways to assure that their legislation 
in fact improves rather than degrades criminal law, and justice, in the 
longer term.  
Unfortunately, criminal law bills, even if useless and unnecessary, 
commonly pass because legislators commonly share a reluctance to appear 
“soft on crime.” When a new and unnecessary offense, say “library theft,” 
is proposed, the issue becomes a referendum on whether legislators care 
about public libraries, not on whether the proposed legislation will actually 
do anything new to combat the problem of such theft, or on whether it will 
instead have pernicious ramifications for the application of the criminal 
code’s general theft provision. A legislator is likely to vote in favor of the 
library-theft bill because there is a clear constituency—library users and 
taxpayers—who would seem to share a concern about library theft, and no 
constituency to complain about the new provision’s less obvious and more 
diffuse drawbacks in creating inconsistencies, ambiguities, and overlaps. 
18 For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The 
Accelerating Degradation of American Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633 (2005); Paul H. 
Robinson, The Rise and Fall and Resurrection of American Criminal Codes, 53 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 
173 (2015). 
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Another sort of systemic problem might be called “punishment 
inflation.” In order to emphasize how seriously the legislators take the new 
offense they have created, the heat of the moment naturally pushes the 
grade of the offense higher than it might otherwise be. A year or two later, 
when that heat has died down, the grade may seem inconsistent with other 
offenses, but the exaggerated grade lives on. 
Worse, the dynamic creates a vicious cycle. Having exaggerated the 
grade of yesterday’s “crime du jour,” the legislator, in order to adequately 
express outrage over today’s crime du jour, must exceed the new, 
exaggerated baseline established by yesterday’s offense. The ultimate 
effect is to create an upward spiral of grading, and a hodge-podge of 
inconsistent offense grades. There is no fixing this problem ad hoc. Internal 
grading consistency within a code requires examining all of its offense and 
suboffense grades at one time, comparing each against the grade of every 
other. 
We see this unhealthy dynamic in every state that we have 
investigated.19 In Kentucky, for example, a relatively thoughtful criminal 
law reformer among the states, it is estimated that there are now 440 
provisions in the criminal code and 1800 criminal offenses outside of the 
code. This is a dramatic increase over what existed when the new 
comprehensive criminal code was enacted in 1974. Yet new forms of 
criminal activity that did not exist in 1974 make up only a trivial number of 
these new offenses.20 
It is possible to recodify current American criminal codes to better 
reflect the community’s true judgments of justice and to better maintain 
that correspondence in the future.21 But the larger point here is that the 
19 See, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON ET AL., REPORT OF THE DELAWARE CRIMINAL LAW 
RECODIFICATION PROJECT (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2950728 
[https://perma.cc/9FFM-U8MA]; PAUL H. ROBINSON ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE MALDIVES PENAL 
LAW AND SENTENCING CODIFICATION PROJECT (2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1522222 [https://
perma.cc/XT5A-KHS4]; PAUL H. ROBINSON, FINAL REPORT OF THE KENTUCKY PENAL CODE 
REVISION PROJECT (2003), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1523384 [https://perma.cc/3EDQ-B42B]; PAUL H. 
ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, FINAL REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS CRIMINAL CODE REWRITE AND 
REFORM COMMISSION (2003), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1290&context=faculty_scholarship [https://perma.cc/PK3C-83WW]. 
20 Robinson & Cahill, supra note 18, at 635–37. 
21 For a discussion of the kinds of reforms one could make to the criminal law amendment process, 
see Robinson, Resurrection, supra note 18, at 182–90. For examples of how studies exposing grading 
irrationalities can be conducted, see Paul H. Robinson, Thomas Gaeta, Matthew Majarian, Megan 
Schultz & Douglas M. Weck, The Modern Irrationalities of American Criminal Codes: An Empirical 
Study of Offense Grading, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 709 (2010); PAUL H. ROBINSON ET AL., 
REPORT ON OFFENSE GRADING IN NEW JERSEY (2011), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1737825 
[https://perma.cc/HBP8-ABRJ]; PAUL H. ROBINSON ET AL., REPORT ON OFFENSE GRADING IN 
PENNSYLVANIA (2010), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1527149 [https://perma.cc/969P-9JMU]. 
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unjust nature of today’s popular crime-control doctrines is not a product of 
the community’s judgments of justice but rather is seriously in conflict with 
them. Those doctrines are more often than not the product of crime-control 
strategies such as general deterrence and incapacitation of the dangerous 
that ignore community judgments of justice (and have been aided and 
abetted by many of the academics who now complain about the injustice of 
current law resulting from such crime-control principles). A criminal law 
built upon lay people’s judgments of justice would be dramatically more 
attentive to tying criminal liability and punishment to an offender’s true 
blameworthiness. As I have argued elsewhere,22 the theory of empirical 
desert, which calls for having criminal law rules reflect community shared 
judgments of justice, produces the best practical approximation of true 
justice.23 
To summarize, although it may seem that community views on 
punishment are draconian or brutish, in reality, those views are rooted 
soundly in principles of proportionality and in fact seriously conflict with 
the harsh and disproportionate penalties found in many modern crime-
control doctrines. That discrepancy is not the result of draconian 
community views but rather the result of academically inspired crime-
control doctrines and the dysfunction of American crime politics. This 
brings us to our third question, which asks whether a criminal law 
concerned with effective crime control should care what communities think 
is just. 
III. WHY SHOULD THE CRIMINAL LAW CARE WHAT THE
COMMUNITY THINKS IS JUST? 
Given what we know about people’s intuitions of justice, is there any 
reason that the criminal law should care about them? Should criminal law 
set its liability and punishment rules to track the justice judgments of the 
community it governs? I believe that the answer to these questions is yes. 
The general line of argument is this: by having criminal law adopt liability 
and punishment rules that track community views, it can enhance criminal 
law’s “moral credibility” for doing justice with the community it governs, 
and that increased moral authority can have strong practical crime-control 
benefits in avoiding resistance and subversion and in gaining deference, 
cooperation, normative influence, and ultimately compliance. 
22 Paul H. Robinson, Joshua Samuel Barton & Matthew Lister, Empirical Desert, Individual 
Prevention, and Limiting Retributivism: A Reply, 17 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 312 (2014). 
23 PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO SHOULD BE PUNISHED 
HOW MUCH? ch. 8 (2008). 
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History certainly suggests such a dynamic, at least for dramatic levels 
of disrespect for the criminal law. The early Soviet criminal justice system 
was notoriously arbitrary and corrupt, with little or no moral credibility 
among the general population. Any compliance it gained was through 
coercion or brutality by the extensive police power. When those power 
centers weakened with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the crime rate 
increased dramatically. It was only the coercive influence of the state’s 
threat that gave the system effect, and once that was gone, so too went its 
control. 
But some previous empirical studies have hinted, and more recent 
studies have confirmed, that this same relationship between the criminal 
justice system’s moral credibility and its ability to gain deference and 
compliance applies not just to extreme cases but to all—that there is a 
general relationship between the system’s moral credibility and its ability 
to gain compliance.24 Even a marginal decrease in the former will produce a 
marginal decrease in the latter. This suggests that any system can improve 
its ability to gain deference and compliance by improving its reputation for 
doing justice and avoiding injustice. 
Why should this be so? Why should undermining the criminal law’s 
moral credibility have the effect of undermining the system’s crime-control 
effectiveness? Let me suggest four mechanisms by which this can occur. 
The forces of social influence and internalized norms are potentially 
enormous. A criminal law that has earned moral credibility with the people 
can harness these powerful social and normative forces through a variety of 
mechanisms. First, a criminal law with moral credibility can harness the 
power of stigmatization. Many people will avoid breaking the law if doing 
so will stigmatize them, and thereby endanger their personal and social 
relationships. The power of stigmatization is cheap—it does not have the 
cost of imprisonment, for example—and it exists even if the threat of 
official sanction is not present; it is enough that friends or acquaintances 
might learn of the misconduct. A criminal law that regularly punishes 
conduct seen as blameless, or at least not deserving the condemnation of 
criminal liability, will be unable to harness the power of stigmatization. 
Second, a system that has earned moral credibility with the people 
also can help avoid vigilantism. People will be less likely to take matters 
into their own hands if they have confidence that the system is trying hard 
to do justice. And, as I detail elsewhere, the danger of vigilantism goes 
beyond those rare souls willing to “go into the streets”; it includes “shadow 
vigilantes” who try to force justice from a system apparently reluctant to do 
24 For a discussion of these issues, see ROBINSON, IJUD, supra note 1, at 176–88. 
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it—normally law-abiding citizens and officials who see the system’s 
failures of justice as justifying their distortion of the criminal justice 
process. Examples of such “vigilantism” include police “testilying” and 
jury nullification, which may acquit excessive use of force against 
aggressors.25  
Third, a reputation for moral credibility can avoid provoking the kind 
of resistance and subversion that we see in criminal justice systems with 
poor reputations. Such resistance and subversion can appear among any of 
the participants in the system. Do victims report offenses? Do potential 
witnesses come forward to help police and investigators? Do police, 
investigators, prosecutors, and judges follow the legal rules, or do they feel 
free to make up their own? In systems with trial juries, do the jurors follow 
their legal instructions or do they make up their own rules? Do offenders 
acquiesce in their liability and punishment, or do they focus instead on 
thinking an injustice has been done to them? 
Finally, the most powerful force that comes from a criminal justice 
system with moral credibility is its power to shape and reinforce societal 
norms, and to cause people to internalize those norms. If the criminal law 
has earned a reputation for doing justice, then when the law criminalizes 
some new form of conduct or makes some conduct a more serious offense 
than it had previously been, the community takes this legal action as 
reliable evidence that the conduct really is more condemnable.26 
The forces of social influence and internalized norms are potentially 
enormous. But if the criminal law conflicts with people’s judgments of 
justice, that conflict will undermine law’s moral credibility and thereby 
undermine criminal law’s ability to harness these forces. 
Let me show the results of just one recent study about this dynamic 
between the system’s moral credibility, and its ability to gain compliance. 
Subjects were tested to determine their views on a variety of issues related 
to whether they would defer to the demands of the criminal law, or help 
investigators, or report an offense, or take criminalization to mean that the 
conduct really was more morally condemnable, and so on—setting a 
baseline for each of the specific mechanisms of potential influence 
described above. The subjects were then told of a variety of real-world 
cases in which the criminal justice system had done serious injustice or 
failed to do justice, not by accident but as the result of legal liability rules 
formally adopted with the knowledge that they would produce results of 
25 See generally PAUL H. ROBINSON & SARAH M. ROBINSON, THE VIGILANTE ECHO: HOW 
FAILURES OF JUSTICE INSPIRE LAWLESSNESS (2017). 
26 For a more detailed discussion of these mechanisms, see ROBINSON, IJUD, supra note 1, at 152–
63.
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which the community would disapprove. After this disillusioning 
information, the subjects were tested again and their views on the measures 
of deference and compliance had all weakened. Both sets of questions used 
a nine-point scale where the higher the number, the greater the deference to 
the criminal law and willingness to comply with it. Here are the results27:  
TABLE 3: WITHIN-SUBJECTS DISILLUSIONMENT STUDY 
Question Baseline Avg. 
Post-Stimu-
lation Avg. Significance 
1. Life sentence means offense conduct must be
heinous 6.46 5.14 p < .001 
2. Law prohibition means posting false
comments must be condemnable 6.14 5.76 p < .07 
3. High sentence for financial maneuver means
condemnable 5.25 4.63 p < .02 
4. Report removal of arrowhead 5.93 5.14 p < .01 
5. Give found handgun to police 6.66 5.56 p < .001 
6. Report dog violation to authorities 5.15 4.59 p < .01 
7. Go back and report your mistake to gas station 7.05 5.69 p < .001 
8. Go back and report your mistake to restaurant 7.15 5.71 p < .001 
The graphic on the next page gives a visual display of this same 
information. The patterned bars show the subjects’ responses before the 
disillusionment, and the gray bars after. 
27 This table is reproduced from ROBINSON, IJUD, supra note 1, at 180. The first column lists not 
the full text of the questions used but rather a short-hand identification of the questions. 
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FIGURE 4 
For all eight questions, deference to the criminal law decreased after 
the disillusioning stimuli. This is actually a quite surprising result, if you 
think about it. When adult subjects are tested in a study like this, they come 
to the study with an already-formed opinion about the moral reliability of 
the criminal justice system. There is a limited amount that a researcher can 
do in the context of a study to shift that preexisting view. But despite the 
fact that we can only marginally shift subjects’ views of the system, we 
nonetheless see a corresponding downward shift in subjects’ willingness to 
defer to the criminal justice system. 
A follow-up study used a slightly different methodology. Instead of 
the “within-subjects design” used in the former study, it used a “between-
subjects design.” That is, instead of asking the same subjects their views 
after being “disillusioned” about the criminal justice system, this study 
used separate groups. The researchers asked all subjects the same questions 
but did not disillusion some subjects, mildly disillusioned other subjects, 
and more seriously disillusioned a third group. The study found that the 
extent of the disillusionment determined the extent to which the subjects 
would defer to the criminal justice system.28 
28 This table is reproduced from ROBINSON, IJUD, supra note 1, at 182. 
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TABLE 4: BETWEEN-SUBJECTS DISILLUSIONMENT STUDY 
Baseline: No 
Disillusionment 
Low 
Disillusionment 
High 
Disillusionment 
1. Life Sentence 6.56a 6.59a 5.35b 
2. Facebook 6.14a 5.38b 5.59b 
3. Financial
Maneuver 5.25
a 5.16a 4.34b 
4. Arrowhead 5.93a 5.65a 4.95b 
5. Hand Gun 6.66a 5.40b 4.32c 
6. Dog Lover 5.15a 4.75a,b 4.43b 
7. Gas Station 7.05a 6.63a 5.63b 
8. Restaurant 7.15a 6.47b 5.84c 
Note: The difference between two figures in the same row is statistically 
insignificant if they share the same letter annotation. That is, the difference 
between two values within the same row is statistically significant if the 
figures are annotated with different letters. 
Another study did not collect new data but sought to determine 
whether the same dynamic was present in some of the large datasets of 
survey data previously collected by others.29 As the table below 
demonstrates,30 the moral credibility measure in the study explains more of 
the variance in the “willingness to defer” measure than any of the other 
measures. In fact, it is the only predictor that is statistically significant. 
TABLE 5: WILLINGNESS TO DEFER STUDY 
Variable Willingness to Defer to Criminal Justice System in the Future 
Standardized Regression Coefficient Significance 
Moral Credibility .265 p < .002 
Male –.072 p < .395 
Age –.128 p < .148 
White .062 p < .476 
Education –.134 p < .144 
Household Income .017 p < .859 
Married .167 p < .069 
What the studies show is that there is a continuous relationship 
between a system’s moral credibility and its ability to gain deference and 
compliance. A marginal decrease in credibility produces a marginal 
29 Robinson et al., supra note 15, at 2016–23. 
30 The table below is reproduced from id. at 2022. 
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decrease in deference and compliance. This is an important conclusion 
because it gives every society, no matter how bad its criminal justice 
system’s reputation, good practical reasons to improve the moral credibility 
of its criminal justice system. Even those systems with better reputations 
can improve their crime-control effectiveness by further improving their 
reputation for justness. 
This insight is particularly important because the truth is that no 
criminal justice system, no matter how careful it is, can have perfect moral 
credibility with every member of the community. This is inevitable in part 
because out from the core of wrongdoing, people within a community will 
disagree among themselves on some matters. Thus, no matter what position 
the criminal code takes, it must risk alienating one group or another. But 
for the reasons noted above, there is still crime-control value in trying to 
maximize the system’s moral credibility by trying to minimize the 
disillusioning effect of these inevitable instances of perceived deviations 
from desert.31 It is also worth mentioning that a criminal justice system’s 
reputation can be influenced not only by the justness of its adjudication 
results but also by the fairness of its adjudication process.32 
To summarize, legal rules that deviate from the community’s 
judgments of justice are not cost-free, as has generally been assumed in the 
past, but rather carry a hidden cost to effective crime control. To be most 
effective, the criminal law should, above all else, try to build a reputation 
as a reliable moral authority that does justice and avoids injustice. In that 
31 When faced with an issue on which there is disagreement within the community, and in trying to 
find the position that will alienate the fewest number of people, it will often make sense to adopt the 
majority view, but not always. One can imagine a situation in which a minority has very strong feelings 
about an issue, while a majority has less strong feelings. In some parts of the U.S., this may be the 
situation regarding abortion or same-sex intercourse, for example. In such situations, one may conclude 
that the criminal justice system’s moral credibility will be least undermined by adopting the strongly 
held view of the significant minority rather than the less strongly held view of the majority. 
32 A system and its processes seen as fair will gain greater deference and compliance than those 
seen as unfair. While the effect of increased “legitimacy,” as Tom Tyler has labeled it, from greater 
procedural fairness and professionalism in policing may not have the power of the system’s increased 
credibility in setting the liability and punishment results, it is sufficient to justify setting procedural 
fairness and police professionalism as important goals on the grounds of effective crime control. For 
further discussions on process legitimacy, see the works of Tom R. Tyler, beginning with his book 
WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006). For a discussion of the similarities and differences and 
interactions between procedural fairness and moral credibility in results, see also ROBINSON, IJUD, 
supra note 1, at 202–07; Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The 
Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
211 (2012).  
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way, it can harness the powerful forces of social and normative influence to 
gain deference and compliance.33 
These findings represent an important change to the classic 
punishment-theory debate, which has always seen two irreconcilably 
opposed camps. On one side are the retributivists, who urge distributing 
punishment in a way that does justice because they see justice as a value in 
itself, and therefore it needs no practical justification. On the other side are 
the utilitarians, who would distribute punishment so as to avoid future 
crime. They believe that punishment can only be justified by its future 
crime reduction and, therefore, typically urge the distribution of 
punishment to optimize general deterrence or the incapacitation of 
dangerous offenders.  
These opposing camps would each propose a distribution of 
punishment to a different set of people and in different amounts, because 
each looks to different criteria. The retributivists, wanting to do justice, 
would look to an offender’s moral blameworthiness. The utilitarians, who 
want to reduce crime, would look to what would most effectively deter and 
incapacitate potential offenders. 
Historically, these two camps have been seen as diametrically opposed 
and unavoidably in conflict. The two goals—of doing justice or fighting 
crime—are seen as naturally in conflict and one must pick between them. 
But the empirical desert studies suggest that the picture is actually quite 
different. It may be that the best way to fight crime is to do justice. 
The superiority of empirical desert as an effective crime-control 
strategy comes in part from the fact that an empirical-desert distribution of 
liability and punishment necessarily carries with it some general deterrent 
effect and some ability to incapacitate dangerous offenders. A just sentence 
can have a deterrent effect and provides an opportunity to incapacitate a 
dangerous offender. In fact, the only way in which those alternative 
distributive principles can do better than empirical desert—the only way 
they can provide greater deterrence or greater opportunity to incapacitate—
is by deviating from it—that is, by doing injustice or by failing to do 
justice. But it is exactly these deviations from desert that undermine the 
system’s moral credibility and, thereby, its crime-control effectiveness. 
Thus, any instance of greater deterrent or incapacitation effect purchased 
33 For a thoughtful critique, and our response immediately following, see Donald Braman, Dan M. 
Kahan & David A. Hoffman, Some Realism About Punishment Naturalism, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1531 
(2010); and Paul H. Robinson, Owen D. Jones & Robert Kurzban, Realism, Punishment, and Reform, 
77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1611 (2010). For another critique, see Christopher Slobogin & Lauren Brinkley-
Rubinstein, Putting Desert in Its Place, 65 STAN. L. REV. 77 (2013). Our reply was Robinson et al., 
Empirical Desert, supra note 22. 
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by an injustice or a failure of justice can be offset by the damage such 
deviation does in reducing the system’s moral credibility. In contrast, an 
empirical desert distribution, based as it is upon tracking the community’s 
judgments of justice, can gain the crime-control benefits of moral 
credibility while maintaining the general deterrent and incapacitation 
benefits inherent in such a distribution. 
It is important to note, however, that the practical crime-control power 
of doing justice is found in distributing criminal liability and punishment 
according to rules rooted in the community’s judgments of justice—
“empirical desert”—rather than philosophers’ notions of justice—
“deontological desert.” For it is the effect of empirical desert in building 
the criminal law’s moral credibility with the community that has the 
beneficial crime-control effect, and that can be achieved only by having 
criminal law track the community’s notion of justice, not the philosophers’ 
notion. And empirical desert is not true justice in a transcendent 
deontological sense.  
On the other hand, the evidence suggests that, as a practical matter, 
empirical desert is in most respects a close approximation of deontological 
desert and, given the practical problems with trying to produce a criminal 
law based upon deontological desert, empirical desert may be the best and 
perhaps the only practical means of adopting a reliable approximation of 
deontological desert.34 
Thus, criminal law that seeks to control crime should very much care 
about what the community thinks is just because to deviate from the 
community’s judgments of justice—to deviate from an empirical-desert 
distributive principle—undermines the system’s credibility and thereby its 
crime-control effectiveness. The greatest deference and compliance from 
the citizens will come from a system that commits itself to an empirical 
desert distribution. This brings us to our final question, which is whether it 
is ever justifiable to deviate from the community’s judgments of justice.  
IV. SHOULD THE CRIMINAL LAW EVER DEVIATE FROM THE COMMUNITY’S
SHARED JUDGMENTS OF JUSTICE? 
Even if there is value in tracking community views, should criminal 
law sometimes deviate from them? If so, when? That is, might one ever be 
justified in deciding that the criminal law should adopt a rule even though it 
is known to conflict with community views of justice? 
34 For more detailed discussion of the issue, see ROBINSON, IJUD, supra note 1, at 172–74; and 
Paul H. Robinson, The Role of Moral Philosophers in the Competition Between Deontological and 
Empirical Desert, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831 (2007). 
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The answer to this question may depend upon why one is adopting a 
criminal law based upon community views. If it is solely out of a 
commitment to democratic ideals, then perhaps the community view should 
always prevail. If one supports adopting the community view because it 
generally reflects the blameworthiness of the offender rather than utilitarian 
crime-control programs of deterrence and incapacitation of the 
dangerous—that is, because it is the best practical approximation of 
deontological desert—then again, one might be hesitant to deviate from 
those community views of justice. 
However, if one supports a criminal law based upon community views 
because of its crime-control potential in harnessing the powerful forces of 
social and normative influence, then logically one ought to be open to 
having criminal law deviate from community views if, by doing so, one 
could get a crime-control benefit that exceeds the crime-control cost of the 
deviation. The good crime-control utilitarian would presumably simply run 
the numbers: one could justify doing injustice or a failure of justice, as the 
community sees it, if such would produce such a large deterrent or 
incapacitative crime-control benefit as to outweigh the crime-control cost 
of reduced moral credibility. 
However, there is reason to be skeptical that this will regularly occur. 
While general deterrence works in theory, research suggests that it is the 
exception rather than the rule that one can increase the criminal law’s 
deterrent effect by manipulating criminal law rules. The problem is that the 
intended targets of the deterrence program, the potential offenders, 
commonly do not know of the criminal law rules that have been formulated 
to maximize deterrence. And even if they did know the rules, this target 
population frequently is irrational; they are not rational calculators who 
will weigh the costs and benefits of their conduct. Rather, they commonly 
are subject to drug abuse, alcoholism, mental illness, impulsiveness, gang 
influence, and so forth. And even if the potential offender knows the 
criminal law rule and is a rational calculator, he commonly will see the 
benefits of crime as outweighing the risks. This is in large part because the 
conviction and punishment rate for offenses is so low as to create little real 
risk that the planned offense will be punished. And, indeed, it is not even 
the actual risks of being caught and punished that matter but the risks 
perceived by the target audience. The target audience that regularly 
underestimates the risk of punishment, as is commonly the case, can 
destroy a deterrence program.35  
35 For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra 
note 23, at chs. 3–4. 
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With regard to deviations from community views in order to 
incapacitate potentially dangerous offenders, there is little doubt that such 
preventive detention can avoid future crime. An incapacitation distributive 
principle does not suffer the ineffectiveness difficulties of a general 
deterrence principle. However, as I have discussed in more detail 
elsewhere,36 the current state of the clinical sciences, such as a poor 
predictive ability and a serious problem of false positives, makes such a 
system costly both in terms of administrative costs and its intrusions on 
personal liberties for the false positives. Perhaps more importantly, so 
openly substituting pure preventive detention for criminal justice would 
destroy the system’s moral credibility—it would make it clear that the 
system is simply not in the justice business—and therefore would lose 
access to the powerful forces of social and normative influence that moral 
credibility would bring. 
It is perhaps no surprise, then, to see that current practice, to the extent 
that it tries to engage such preventive detention measures, does so while 
cloaking those measures as if they were criminal justice. However, the 
distortions required for such cloaking dramatically undermine the 
effectiveness of the preventive detention project. It turns out that both 
society and potential detainees would be better off if preventive detention, 
if done at all, were done openly in a civil commitment system disconnected 
from criminal justice. 
While I see little justification for deviating from community views in 
order to promote effective crime control, let me suggest two situations in 
which deviation might be appropriate.  
First, as noted above, community judgments of justice—empirical 
desert—are not the same as true justice in a transcendent sense—what one 
might call deontological desert. The community could be wrong about what 
constitutes justice, as we have seen in the slaveholding South in the U.S. 
prior to the Civil War, for example. Another example is the discriminatory 
treatment of women in our own history (and continuing in many societies 
today). We as a society may hold views today that people fifty years from 
now will look upon as appalling. Today’s empirical desert can be wrong.  
If today’s community is blind to the injustice of some criminal law 
rule, the law ought to deviate from those community views. The problem, 
of course, is how are we to know this if the community fails to see the 
injustice. There seems no reliable mechanism by which the many claims of 
injustice can be screened to determine those few that might stand the test of 
36 For more detailed discussion of these issues, see id. at ch. 6; and Paul H. Robinson, Punishing 
Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429 (2001). 
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time. What one can say, however, is that a society ought to be constantly 
vigilant in testing its current criminal law to determine whether its rules are 
producing unappreciated injustices. 
One final reason to deviate from community views is likely to be more 
common, and more important. It is sometimes the case that government or 
social leaders can see a need to change community norms regarding a 
particular practice or conduct. In the United States, for example, over the 
past several decades people’s views have shifted on the condemnability of 
such things as insider trading, domestic violence, drunk driving, 
downloading music without a license, and date rape. Social and political 
reformers have seen these shifts in public attitudes as important to the 
creation of a better society. But if criminal law is always to follow the 
community’s current judgments of justice, then how can law play a role in 
helping to bring changes in community views? If empirical desert is the 
distributive principle, it would seem to condemn criminal law to be always 
a follower of public opinion, never a leader. 
Certainly, if community views change, then criminal law can and 
should change with it. But must criminal law always be a follower? Can 
criminal law sometimes be used to help bring about changes in the 
community’s judgments about what is condemnable? The criminal law 
certainly could be effective in doing this. By more broadly criminalizing 
certain conduct or by increasing the penalties assigned to it, the criminal 
law can signal to citizens that they ought to think of such conduct as being 
more condemnable than they had previously thought it. 
But using criminal law to change community views creates 
complications for empirical desert.37 If empirical desert is attractive as a 
distributive principle because, by tracking community views, it can earn a 
reputation as being a reliable moral authority and can inspire greater 
deference to its commands and greater internalization of its norms,38 then if 
the law conflicts with community views—by being out in front of public 
views—it can lose its crime-control effectiveness because it might come to 
be seen as an unreliable and unjust distributor of punishment. 
Thus, whenever criminal law seeks to be a leader of community 
views, it must worry that such deviation risks undermining its moral 
credibility. American Prohibition in the 1920s illustrates the problem. 
Because of a combination of political forces, a constitutional amendment 
was passed that prohibited the sale of alcohol in the United States, even 
though only a minority of Americans actually supported such 
37 See ROBINSON, IJUD, supra note 1, at 70–82. 
38 See ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 23, at 175–212. 
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criminalization. The law was thus seen by most citizens as criminalizing 
conduct that was not sufficiently condemnable to be treated as criminal. 
The result was an alcohol ban that was famously ignored. Americans 
continued to make and drink alcohol, which brought them into conflict with 
the criminal law. What is most interesting in this historical episode is that 
citizens increasingly ignored not only the criminal law ban on alcohol but 
also criminal law’s other prohibitions. Crime rates increased, even for 
offenses unrelated to the use, sale, or manufacture of alcohol. The criminal 
law’s loss of moral credibility with the community undermined its crime-
control effectiveness generally. 
This is exactly as the reasoning underlying empirical desert would 
predict. As the criminal law pressed its prohibition on alcohol despite the 
fact that a majority of the community did not see alcohol as sufficiently 
condemnable to be criminal, the criminal law’s reputation with the 
community suffered. People could reason that if the criminal law could be 
so wrong about the condemnability of alcohol use, perhaps it was also 
wrong about some of the other things that it prohibits. In 1933, Prohibition 
was repealed and the criminal law began to heal its injured reputation.39 
Prohibition nicely illustrates the dangers for any social reformer who 
seeks to use criminal law to change community views. If the reformer seeks 
to persuade people that certain conduct, such as drunk driving, is really 
much more condemnable than they thought, by broadening the prohibition 
and the penalties for drunk driving, the legal reform might well be able to 
influence community views, and shift them, to have people see drunk 
driving as more condemnable. And as the community view shifts, the 
conflict between community views and the criminal law disappears, and 
with it disappears the danger that a code–community conflict will 
undermine the criminal law’s moral credibility. On the other hand, there is 
the danger that the criminal law’s attempt to change community views will 
be unsuccessful, as it was in Prohibition. And when that happens, the 
conflict between community views and the criminal law does not go away 
but continues, and continues to undermine the law’s credibility.  
Ironically, it is social reformers more than any other group who should 
be most anxious to develop and maintain the system’s moral credibility, 
because it is that credibility that gives criminal law the power to shift 
societal norms. If law lacks moral authority, it can do nothing to change 
people’s views. Thus, social reformers ought to consider a general 
approach of this sort: In regard to most issues, have criminal law maximize 
its moral credibility with the community by carefully following existing 
39 For a detailed discussion of the Prohibition, see ROBINSON, PIRATES, supra note 12, at ch. 8. 
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community views so as to build its reputation as a reliable moral authority. 
Once that reputation has been established—once the criminal law has 
earned “moral credibility chips” with the community—reformers can 
carefully and selectively “spend” those chips by having law criminalize or 
punish more severely the conduct about which it seeks to change 
community views. The legal change will signal to the community that they 
should see the conduct as more condemnable, and the law’s credibility will 
induce citizens to accept and internalize this view. If the reform is 
successful in changing people’s views, then the gap between the criminal 
law and community views will disappear and the reform can be 
consolidated. If the effort is not successful in changing people’s views, then 
the effort should be abandoned before the conflict between community 
views and the criminal law brings the criminal law into disrepute. 
To be clear, there is no problem with social reformers seeking to 
change community views through means other than criminal law reform. 
There is no damage to criminal law—no undermining of its moral 
credibility—if social reformers use mechanisms such as advertising, 
education, governmental proclamation, or any other mechanism to 
influence people. 
Let me offer one last piece of advice to social reformers who are 
hoping to change community views on the condemnability of specific 
conduct: not all community judgments about what should be criminal can 
be effectively altered.40 Some judgments are so deep-seated as to be 
essentially immune to attempts to change them. This is probably true of 
people’s judgments that serious wrongdoing should be condemned and 
punished and people’s view that the core of criminality—physical 
aggression, taking of property without consent, and deceit in exchanges—is 
condemnable. As noted above, there is good evidence to suggest that 
people’s judgments on such matters are the product of a partially innate 
predisposition as a result of evolutionary development; they are not 
something that can be educated or coerced out of people’s thinking.41 
The immutability of people’s judgments about the core of wrongdoing 
does provide an interesting insight that reformers might usefully exploit: 
reformers can increase their ability to have people see some conduct as 
deservedly criminal if they can build up in people’s minds the strength of 
the analogy between that conduct and the core of wrongdoing. For 
example, there has been a major effort by companies and artists who 
produce music, movies, or books to persuade people that they should not 
40 See ROBINSON, IJUD, supra note 1, at 74–76. 
41 See ROBINSON, IJUD, supra note 1, at ch. 3. 
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download such materials without a proper license. People used to think of 
such downloading as being primarily a technical violation of copyright law, 
not truly condemnable conduct. But the public campaign to change those 
views has been somewhat successful, and the most successful part of it has 
been a publicity campaign that seeks to build the analogy to core 
wrongdoing with images of a musician having money taken from his 
pocket—an attempt to visually build the analogy between downloading 
without a license and physical theft. 
To summarize, one can justify deviations from community views 
when using criminal law to help change societal norms, but such use is 
possible only if a system has earned moral credibility by generally adhering 
to empirical desert as a distributive principle and is wise only if used 
occasionally, selectively, and carefully.  
CONCLUSION 
Distributing criminal liability and punishment according to rules based 
upon the community’s judgments of justice can be attractive for purely 
democratic reasons. It also may be attractive because an “empirical desert” 
distribution may be the most feasible best approximation of “deontological 
desert”—justice in some broader transcendent sense as moral philosophers 
would define it. But what may be most striking about empirical desert as a 
distributive principle is that it ought also to be attractive to crime-control 
utilitarians. Because empirical desert will, essentially by definition, be seen 
as the most just of all distributive principles, it has the ability to harness the 
powerful forces of social and normative influence. 
Having earned such moral credibility, the criminal justice system can 
reduce resistance and subversion; can increase assistance, cooperation, and 
acquiescence; can engage the powerful yet inexpensive mechanism of 
stigmatization; can reduce the likelihood of vigilantism; can gain greater 
compliance in borderline cases of conduct whose condemnability is 
unsettled; and, perhaps most importantly, can increase its ability to have 
community members internalize its norms. 
But the proper place of community views is in the creation of legal 
rules, not in the adjudication of individual cases. Lay judgments in 
individual cases can be distorted by biases, consciously or otherwise, that 
even the laypersons themselves would agree ought to play no role in 
distributing punishment. These biases can be isolated when social 
psychologists test lay judgments of justice, but cannot be effectively 
controlled when the community is asked to directly judge an individual 
case. Further, a system based upon a codified set of liability and 
punishment rules will produce greater uniformity in application and, 
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therefore, greater moral credibility in the long term, than a system of ad hoc 
adjudication. 
Once the criminal law has earned a reputation as a reliable moral 
authority, it can “spend” those moral credibility “chips” in trying to lead 
rather than follow community views on selective issues. But reformers 
must be ready to pull back if the reform efforts are not successful, in order 
to avoid damaging its reputation for justice and thereby endangering its 
effectiveness as an engine of reform in the future. Reformers should also 
avoid wasting their hard-earned chips by spending them on attempts to 
modify community views that are simply not malleable. It would be a 
hopeless and wasteful exercise, for example, to try to persuade the 
community that they should not want serious wrongdoing to be punished, 
as many modern punishment abolitionists seek to do. 
Social reformers are encouraged to use any number of other 
institutions of social influence to shape community views, including 
schools, social media, religious organizations, community activism, and the 
political process. And whatever community judgments of justice are 
changed by these processes, the criminal law should be careful to follow if 
it is to maintain its reputation for justness. 
 To conclude, the available evidence suggests not that community 
judgments of justice are an endless collection of individual disagreements 
but that there is strong agreement on a core of issues regarding the relative 
blameworthiness of a wide range of offenses and offenders. And those 
shared judgments of justice are not brutish and draconian, but rather stand 
in stark contrast to the brutish and draconian measures created by the 
modern coercive crime-control doctrines of general deterrence and 
incapacitation of the dangerous, which disconnect criminal law from the 
constraints of justice. That disconnection, in the name of effective crime 
control, reflects a failure to appreciate the crime-control cost of criminal 
law’s conflicts with community judgments of justice. Such evidence should 
influence criminal law reformers to attempt to firmly connect the criminal 
law to community judgments of justice. 
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